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The present study has been designed to disentangle cognitive and emotional dimensions
of empathy in a group of mentally healthy and highly alexithymic individuals (ALEX, n = 24)
and well-matched controls (n = 26) through questionnaire Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(IRI) and Multifaceted Empathy Task (MET) used during the fMRI and after the fMRI.
Simultaneously, Skin Conductance Response (SCR) has been acquired as an implicit
measure of emotional reaction. Results show an impaired emotional empathic ability
in alexithymic individuals, with lower levels of SCR and higher activation in prefrontal
brain regions such as the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and inferior frontal gyrus
(IFG). Cognitive empathy was not impaired in the alexithymic group and the results were
accompanied by a higher activation left IFG. The study leads to the conclusion that
alexithymia does not only involve a diminished ability to identify and describe one’s own
emotions. Furthermore, it is related to a deeper disability of emotion regulation, which
becomes visible through impaired emotional concern for others and higher levels of
personal distress.
Keywords: alexithymia, fMRI, cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, subjective arousal
INTRODUCTION
Understanding each other, cognitively as well as emotionally, is one of the marks of the human.
However, humans are differently equipped with the ability to understand others and themselves.
Some of these inabilities might stem from a mental disorder, while others can be attributed to
differences in personality. Some personality traits lay on the border of personality accentuation and
disorder and have yet to be researched. Alexithymia is one such trait.
Alexithymia (Sifneos, 1973) is a personality trait associated with impairments in identifying
and describing one’s own emotions, an externally oriented thinking style, and a restricted ability to
fantasize. 10% of the general population has been estimated to be highly alexithymic (Franz et al.,
2008). Alexithymia has been associated with many psychiatric disorders and is considered a risk
factor for mental health (Taylor, 2004; Conrad et al., 2009).
Since the understanding of one’s own emotional states is impaired in alexithymia, there
has been growing interest in alexithymia’s implications for social cognition (Grynberg et al.,
2010; van der Velde et al., 2013). A core aspect of social cognition, empathy, has been reported
to be reduced in alexithymic individuals (Moriguchi et al., 2007; Grynberg et al., 2010).
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Moriguchi et al. (2006) reported lower levels of emotional
concern, the poorer ability of theory of mind (ToM), and higher
levels of personal distress in highly alexithymic individuals.
Empathy is an isomorphic affective state arising from the
affective state of another individual, in which the observer
is aware that the origin of the emotion is within the other
(Engen and Singer, 2013). It is a multi-dimensional concept
(Davis and Association, 1980; Davis, 1983; Dziobek et al., 2008)
with cognitive and emotional dimensions, both separable yet
related to each other. According to Dziobek et al. (2008),
cognitive empathy (CE) encompasses the capacity to infer
affective states of others and to be able to take the perspective
of others and, as a result of this process, to be able to
name those emotions, a concept similar to Theory of Mind
(ToM). Emotional empathy (EE), on the other hand, is one’s
emotional response to the emotional states of others, e.g.,
feeling concern.
Alexithymia is a determining variable of empathic ability
in high-functioning autistic individuals (Bird et al., 2010). In
a population of autistic spectrum disorders, Dziobek et al.
(2008) demonstrated that high-functioning autistic individuals
showed lower levels of CE but equal levels of EE compared
to people without autism. While it was long assumed that
autistic individuals have diminished empathic ability (Gillberg,
1992), research in the last two decades has shown that ToM
ability is diminished in high-functioning autistic individuals,
while the emotional empathic ability is not (Dziobek et al.,
2008). In an earlier fMRI study focusing on interoceptive
awareness in individuals with an autism spectrum condition
with and without alexithymic symptoms, Silani et al. (2008)
suggested that it was the degree of alexithymia, not the autism
spectrum condition, that was a stronger predictor of brain
activity in the interceptive cortex (i.e., anterior insula) and
reduced levels of empathy. Bird et al. (2010) confirmed this
when they found increased activation in the left anterior
insula while empathizing with the suffering of others. The
signal in the left anterior insula was predicted by the level
of alexithymia in both the autism spectrum and control
groups, hence their suggestion that the level of alexithymia
is a predicting factor for the level of empathic ability, not
solely autism.
The assumption of the two distinct modes of social cognition
also finds support in brain research, with different neural routes
for its two components. The Theory of Mind is associated
with the medial prefrontal cortex, superior temporal sulcus,
and adjacent temporoparietal junction (TPJ; Frith and Frith,
2006; Mitchell, 2008). Emotional empathy is associated with
insular, anterior cingulate, and somatosensory cortices (Lane
et al., 1998; Bird et al., 2010). Core regions for empathy such
as the temporal-parietal junction, temporal pole, orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC), and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) have rarely
been reported in studies on alexithymic samples (Kano et al.,
2003; Kano and Fukudo, 2013; Moriguchi et al., 2007).
As rare evidence, in correlational studies, Moriguchi et al.
(2006, 2009) reported impaired IFG and medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC) activity related to alexithymia in a ToM task
(Moriguchi et al., 2006).
The current study has been designed to gain a deeper
understanding of alexithymia and the cognitive and emotional
components of empathy in a mentally healthy sample. As
stated above, many studies to date used alexithymia as a
correlational variable or used clinical or samples that were not
screened. Mental illnesses and their etiological backgrounds are
highly complicated. It is a challenge to discern if the ability
to identify and describe one’s own emotions is altered due
to a previous mental illness or if the alexithymic personality
accentuation makes one prone to developing mental disorders.
For these reasons, the present study eschews a correlational
approach. It is rather based on two extreme groups of
high-alexithymic and low-alexithymic individuals, both free
of current and past mental illness. This attention to the
subjects was not only a methodological issue but is essential
to understanding the true relationship between alexithymia and
any related human ability, without the confounding effects of
mental disorders.
Based on Bird et al. (2010) and Moriguchi et al. (2006),
our first hypothesis is that highly alexithymic mentally healthy
individuals have an impairment of the emotional dimension
of empathy. Guided by the common definition of alexithymia
(Sifneos, 1973), alongside an inability of identifying one’s
own emotions, our second hypothesis is that subjects with
alexithymia suffer from an impairment on the cognitive
dimension of empathy.
Research on alexithymia and human brain function has
been frustratingly inconsistent. Despite numerous neuroimaging
studies on alexithymia (SPECT, fMRI, EEG; PET; see for
details: Moriguchi and Komaki, 2013; van der Velde et al.,
2013), after more than 20 years of research on brain function
in alexithymia, researchers have failed to identify a common
pattern of brain function related to altered empathic ability in
alexithymia. Thus, our study applies a whole-brain approach
without specific ROI-analyses to explore the differences in brain
activation patterns in two dimensions of empathy in highly
alexithymic individuals and controls. Even though we expect
diminished brain activity in core regions of empathy such as the
insula, TPJ, prefrontal cortex, IFG andOFC in highly alexithymic




Twenty-four mentally healthy and highly alexithymic individuals
(ALEX) from a community based healthy sample and 26 strictly
matched control subjects participated in the final sample of
the study. All subjects were recruited via an announcement
on the public transport system in Berlin, Germany. They
filled out an online version of the Toronto Alexithymia Scale
(TAS-20, Bagby et al., 1994). Those that had a score above
56 and below 40 were invited for further investigation (the
cut-offs were decided based on Bagby et al., 1994; Taylor
et al., 2003). In the next session, participants filled out a set of
questionnaires including the Bermond and Vorst Alexithymia
Questionnaire (BVAQ, Vorst and Bermond, 2001). Later on,
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 September 2020 | Volume 14 | Article 112
Alkan Härtwig et al. Diminished Emotional Empathic Ability in Alexithymia
the participants who were interested in participating and
suitable for magnetic resonance imaging were interviewed
with a Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I.,
Sheehan et al., 1998) clinical interview. All participants with
past or current psychiatric and neurological disorders, substance
abuse, or severemedical conditions were excluded from the study
(see Table 1 for demographics). From the initial of a sample
of 60 participants, data of some had to be excluded due to
quality reasons of the fMRI-analyses as followed: four controls
and three ALEX due to excessive motion, one ALEX because of a
lesion, two controls due to their difficulties pressing the buttons
and reading the task. Therefore, the final sample is constituted
of 24 ALEX and 26 Controls. The local ethics committee
of Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Germany approved
the study.
Procedure
fMRI study was a part of broader investigations on alexithymia,
which were conducted in several sessions. Assessment of
alexithymia and the psychiatric interview were employed in
the preceding sessions. On the day of the experiment, current
depressive mood and state and trait anxiety were assessed just
before the experiment. Participants were informed thoroughly
about the experiment and magnet imaging. A demo version
of the experiment (with other stimuli than in the original
experiment) was shown on a PC. Participants gave written
consent before the experiment and were reimbursed with
20 Euros at the end of the session.
After the acquisition of imaging data, subjects participated
in a post-experimental rating on a PC. The post-Experimental
rating was identical to the experiment (see ‘‘Stimuli and Task’’
section) but with a Likert scale of 1–9 and there was an
additional block for ‘‘the experienced clarity of the seen emotion’’
with the question: ‘‘How well does this picture depict the
emotion X?’’
Psychometric Assessment and Analyses
The level of alexithymia was measured thoroughly by TAS-20,
BVAQ, and Observer Alexithymia Scale (OAS, Haviland et al.,
2000). Alexithymia is associated with anxiety (Espina Eizaguirre
et al., 2004) and depression, therefore the Spielberger State-Trait-
Anxiety-Inventory (STAI, Spielberger et al., 1983; Laux et al.,
1991) and Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961)
were examined to control for possible confounding variables.
Additional to the exclusion of all patients with past and current
mental disorders, participants with a BDI score over 18 were
excluded from further analysis (Beck et al., 1988).
Measures
TAS-20
Twenty-Item Toronto Alexithymia Scale is a self-report
instrument with replicated validity and reliability (Bagby et al.,
1994). It gives a total score and scores from three subscales;
Difficulty Describing Feelings (DDF), Difficulty Identifying
Feelings (DIF), and External Oriented Thinking (EOT);
i.e., focusing on external and technical dimension of a theme
rather than focusing on feelings or other aspects of inner
experience.
BVAQ
The Bermond-Vorst-Alexithymia-Scale (Vorst and Bermond,
2001) consists of five scales, each scale comprising eight
items. It is one of the measures of alexithymia with high
statistical characteristics. It was developed in Dutch and validated
in many other languages, including German. The scales of
TABLE 1 | Descriptives and TAS-20, BVAQ and OAS scores of ALEX and Controls.
ALEX n = 24 (11 females) Controls n = 26 (11 females) T-test
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) T (df) p
Age 34.96 (10.52) 34.69 (10.05) 0.091 (48) 0.928
Years of education 12.83 (0.63) 12.46 (1.33) 1.271 (48) 0.221
TAS-20 Total 64.73 (6.12) 37.54 (4.49) 18.00 (48) <0.001
DIF 62.20 (10.83) 34.42 (7.55) 10.58 (48) <0.001
DDF 80.41 (11.02) 39.00 (8.12) 15.20 (48) <0.001
EOT 57.16 (2.65) 40.12 (7.32) 5.76 (48) <0.001
BVAQ Total 133.20 (14.80) 84.73 (13.38) 12.16 (48) <0.001
Verbalizing 33.58 (4.35) 15.96 (4.05) 14.82 (48) <0.001
Fantasizing 22.41 (6.73) 19.19 (6.68) 1.69 (48) <0.001
Identifying 28.20 (5.16) 13.96 (4.19) 10.74 (48) <0.001
Emotionalizing 26.08 (3.32) 21.15 (3.36) 5.20 (48) <0.001
Analyzing 22.91 (7.05) 14.46 (4.34) 5.14 (48) <0.001
OAS n = 21 (8 females) n = 20 (7 females)
OAS Total 1.16 (0.40) 0.77 (0.19) 3.920 (39) <0.001
Distant 1.58 (0.42) 0.94 (0.40) 4.935 (39) <0.001
Insightful 0.98 (0.51) 66 (0.32) 2.420 (39) 0.021
Humor 0.95 (0.50) 0.57 (0.47) 2.475 (39) 0.018
Rigid 1.22 (0.70) 0.71 (0.49) 2.479 (39) 0.009
Somatization 0.77 (0.65) 0.89 (0.52) 2.718 (39) 0.529
Abbreviations: TAS-20, Toronto Alexithymia Scale; DIF, Difficulty Identifying Feelings; DDF, Difficulty Describing Feelings; EOT, Externally Oriented Thinking; BVAQ, Bermond Vorst
Alexithymia Questionnaire; OAS, Observer Alexithymia Scale.
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FIGURE 1 | Tasks of the experiment [a modified version of multifaceted empathy task (MET), Dziobek et al., 2008]. Stimuli were presented in blocks of 10.
Abbreviations: HLB, high-level-baseline.
BVAQ are Emotionalizing, Fantasizing, Identifying, Analyzing,
and Verbalizing.
Observer Alexithymia Scale (OAS)
The Observer Alexithymia Scale (OAS, Haviland et al., 2000)
is a third personal rating of alexithymic dimensions by a close
friend or relative of the person. OAS was developed based on the
Q-Sort technique, adjective descriptions of scientific and clinical
experts of alexithymia. It has good internal consistency and high
correlations with self-report alexithymia scales (Haviland et al.,
2001). It reveals a total score and six subscores.
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)
Empathic ability was assessed using the Interpersonal
Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis and Association, 1980; Davis,
1983), which consists of four subscales: Perspective Taking;
i.e., cognitively taking the perspective of the other, Empathic
Concern; i.e., being emotionally concerned for the other, Personal
Distress; i.e., experiencing negative feelings in response to other
people’s distress and Fantasy; i.e., emotional identification with
fictional figures.
Statistical Analyses of Questionnaire Measures
Differences between groups on all questionnaire measures and
demographical paradigms (except gender) have been analyzed
through T-test with separate groups analysis or analysis-of-
variance (ANOVA) using SPSS-25 (IBM Corp., 2017).
fMRI Study
Stimuli and Task
A modified fMRI adaptation of the Multifaceted Empathy Task
(MET; Dziobek et al., 2008) was used as an experimental task
(see Figure 1 for the details). The task included 40 pictures of
faces with the emotional expression of negative valence. In all
conditions accompanying the emotional picture, a question was
presented with a dichotomous answer. Please note that after
the fMRI experiment the subjects answered the same questions
as in the experimental conditions again with a Likert-Scale of
1–9 during the post-experimental ratings on a PC.
There were three experimental conditions, namely: cognitive
empathy, emotional empathy, subjective arousal; and two
high-level baseline conditions, namely: high-level baseline
gender and high-level baseline age:
Cognitive Empathy (naming the emotion of the other):
How is this person feeling? (with two emotion adjectives as
answer choices).
Emotional Empathy (emotional concern for the other): How
concerned are you for this person? (rather high/rather low).
Subjective Arousal: How much does this picture arouse you?
(rather high/rather low).
High-level-baseline gender: Is this person male or female?
(female/male).
High-level-baseline age: Is this person young or old?
(young/old).
A block of just observing the stimuli without responding and
another block of just responding to press button commands have
been shown once in each experimental run. These blocks were
included in the study as extra control conditions.
An extra block for the experienced level of clarity of the
emotional stimuli was included in the post-experimental-rating
but was not a part of the fMRI-task: ‘‘How well this picture
depicts the emotion X?’’ which was rated on a Likert-Scale
of 1–9.
Experimental Procedure
Each block started with the block question (8 s). Each
stimulus was presented for 4.5 s. Inter-trial intervals were
jittered (minimum 2 s, maximum 16 s, mean 4 s) using
OptSeq2 (OptSeq1). Stimuli were pseudo-randomized
within each block and equally distributed across the blocks
(see Figure 2 for the details). The experiment consisted
of two runs with 10 blocks in each and the order of the
blocks was counterbalanced according to the odd and
even ID-Numbers. Each run lasted 13.5 min. There was a
short break between the runs. If the participant desired,
s/he could wait for several minutes before the second run
started. Stimuli were displayed using the experimental control
software Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., Albany,
CA, USA2).
The experimental stimuli were presented on the goggles worn
by the subjects. The sight was corrected individually for the
subjects who needed eyeglasses.
1https://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq/
2www.neurobs.com
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FIGURE 2 | Presentation of an experimental block. Cognitive empathy as an example. Each block has started with a block question and continued with 10 stimuli
including a picture depicting a person in a negative emotional state, the typical block question, and the dichotomous answers.
Data Acquisition
Whole-brain MRI Data was collected on 3 Tesla Siemens Tim
Trio (Erlangen, Germany) A scanner with a standard head coil
of 32-Channels was used. Head movement was minimized with
foam rubber pads. A sagitally oriented T1-weighted structural
volume (TE: 2.52 ms; TR: 1,900 ms; flip angle: 9◦; FoV: 256;
voxel size, 1 × 1 × 1 mm) was acquired for the registration of
functional images. Echoplanar data (T2∗) was acquired using the
standard parameters (TE: 35 ms; TR: 2,000 ms, flip angle: 90◦,
FOV: 256 mm; matrix: 64 × 64; voxel size, 3 × 3 × 3 mm;
37 slices).
Data Analysis
The pre-processing of the data was carried out using FEAT
from FMRIB’s Software Library (FSL3; Smith et al., 2004).
Before statistical analysis, the following steps were employed:
slice-motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002),
slice-time correction using Fourier-space time-series phase
shifting, and non-brain removal using BET (Smith, 2002). The
normalized images were smoothed using 8mmFWHMGaussian
Kernel and were high-pass filtered (sigma = 50.5 s).
FLIRT (Jenkinson and Smith, 2001; Jenkinson et al., 2002)
was used for the linear registration of functional images
(T2∗) to subject’s own high-resolution (T1) and high-resolution
image to a standard image implemented by the program
(MNI-152). Later on, during the group analysis, these two
transformations were combined, which brings the low-resolution
functional images (T2∗) directly to high-resolution the standard
image (MNI-152).
fMRI data were analyzed in a general linear model
implemented by FEAT of FSL. Time series were modeled
for each individual using event-related regressors for five
conditions, instruction, and response (pressing the button)
and convolved with the gamma-variate of the hemodynamic
3www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl
response function. The separate baseline conditions for gender
and age were aggregated for further analyses and named as HLB
(high-level-baseline). Contrast images for Cognitive Empathy
(Cognitive Empathy vs. HLB), Subjective Arousal (Subjective
Arousal vs. HLB), Emotional Empathy (Emotional Empathy
vs. HLB) were computed for each participant. During the
group analysis, the functional images of these contrasts were
transformed into the standard space (Jenkinson et al., 2002),
as explained above. In the higher-level analyses, we reported
the activations of cluster corrected (z > 2.7, p < 0.05)
whole-brain data.
Psychophysiological Data Acquisition and
Analyses
Electrodermal activity (EDA) was measured as skin conductance
response (SCR) with constant-voltage-technique. We applied
electrode paste and placed silver-silver chloride MR capable
electrodes (Brain Products Gmbh, Gliching Germany) at the
palmar middle phalanges of the index and middle fingers of the
left hand. The SCR signal was recorded in DC mode using a
bipolar BrainAmp ExG MR amplifier (Brain Products Gmbh,
Gliching, Germany).
EDA data was analyzed using BrainVision Analyzer 2 (Brain
Products Gmbh, Gliching Germany). Mean amplitude (Max-
Min) over all stimuli was used as the main parameter for
EDA analyses. First of all, high-pass (5 Hz, 24 dB/oct) and
low-pass (0.016 Hz, time constant: 9.947, 24 dB/oct) filters
were applied. Then we applied local DC detrend and baseline
correction beginning 500 ms before the stimulus presentation.
Min and Max markers were put automatically for each stimulus
segment and corrected manually by a research assistant, who
was blind to the knowledge alexithymia level of the subjects.
The absolute difference between the lowest point and highest
point of an SCR-curve was transported into SPSS 22 (IBM
Corp., 2013) for further analysis. The mean of the amplitude
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Fantasy 22.38 (5.1) 26.31 (4.4) −2.933 (48) 0.011
Empathy 22.88 (5.5) 27.54 (4.7) −3.240 (48) <0.001
Perspective taking 24.71 (3.8) 27.58 (3.7) −2.688 (48) 0.047
Personal distress 18.71 (5.3) 15.35 (3.6) 2.641 (48) 0.045
Competence 24.25 (2.8) 24.81 (2.4) −0.751 (48) 0.456
BDI 5.58 (3.10) 2.46 (2.10) 4.12 (48) <0.000
STAI-State 34.88 (5.76) 31.81 (6.31) 1.78 (48) 0.80
STAI-Trait 37.16 (6.48) 30.26 (4.57) 4.37 (48) <0.000
Abbreviations: ALEX, highly alexithymic individuals; SD, standard deviation; IRI,
Interpersonal Reactivity Scale; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; STAI, State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory.




There were no differences between the groups concerning
age, years of education (see Table 1 for details), and gender
(X2(1) = 0.063; p = 0.513). The mean age of the 50 participants
was 34.8 (SD = 10.17).
The highly alexithymic (ALEX) participants (n = 24,
11 females) and the low alexithymic (control) participants
(n = 26, 11 females) differed significantly on all subscales
and total score of BVAQ and TAS-20 (the groups were built
according to TAS-20 scores. See ‘‘Sample’’ section and Table 1 for
the details).
ALEX had significantly higher scores on OAS-Total
and all subscales of OAS but somatization (see
Table 1 for the details). OAS was filled out by
partners or first-grade relatives of the subjects with
subjects’ consent and sent directly to our institutes
by the observers. We received the filled-out OAS
of 21 ALEX (eight females) and 20 control subjects
(seven females).
ALEX had significantly lower scores on all empathy-related
subscales of IRI and higher than controls on Personal Distress
(see Table 2 and Figure 3 for details).
Although clinically insignificantly small, ALEX had higher
scores on BDI and STAI-T than controls. Therefore, all further
analyses were controlled for depressivity and trait anxiety.
The groups did not differ on state anxiety (see Table 2
for details).
Results From the fMRI Experiment
Subjective Ratings of Emotional Experience
ALEX showed significantly lower emotional empathy and
subjective arousal than the controls, which has been seen in the
main effect of group in ANOVA (F(1,46) = 8.248, p = 0.006;
controlled for BDI and STAI-T) and in post hoc t-tests of
Empathy-condition (T(48) = −2.585; p = 0.012) and Arousal-
FIGURE 3 | Scores of Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), ALEX had lower
scores on Empathy Fantasy and Perspective Taking subscales and higher on
Personal Distress subscale. The Error-bars indicate standard deviation (SD).
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.001. Abbreviations: ALEX, highly alexithymic individuals.
FIGURE 4 | Differences in ratings of subjective arousal and emotional
empathy during the fMRI experiment and the post-experiment-ratings. Note:
Subjective Arousal during fMRI: ratings of subjective arousal during fMRI
experiment range: 1–2, Emotional Empathy during fMRI: ratings of emotional
empathy during fMRI experiment range: 1–2, Subjective Arousal in
Post-experimental ratings: ratings of subjective arousal in post-experiment
range: 1–9, Emotional Empathy in post-experimental ratings: ratings of
emotional empathy in post-experiment range: 1–9. The error bars indicate the
standard deviation (SD). ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.005.
condition (T(48) = −3.154; p = 0.003; see Figure 4 for details).
The main effect of the task and the interaction between group
and task were not significant.
When reaction times were taken into consideration,
there appeared to be a significant main effect of the task
(F(3,138) = 7.725; p < 0.000), indicating that subjects reacted
faster in the HLB-condition than in any other condition
(controlled for BDI and STAI-T). The main effect of group and
group task interaction was not significant, showing that ALEX
was not slower or faster than controls.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 September 2020 | Volume 14 | Article 112
Alkan Härtwig et al. Diminished Emotional Empathic Ability in Alexithymia
Post-experimental Ratings
There was a significant main effect of task (F(3,135) = 5.155;
p = 0.002). The group task interaction was significant
(F(3,135) = 6.470; p = 0.004). Post hoc t-tests revealed lower arousal
(T(47) = −3.000; p = 0.004) and emotional empathy ratings
(T(47) = −2.165; p = 0.035) in ALEX.
The main effect of group was not significant. In reaction
times, there was a significant main effect of the task
(F(3,135) = 2.907; p = 0.049) indicating slowest responses in
the condition of ‘‘experienced clarity of the seen emotional
expression.’’ The main effect of group and task group interaction
was not significant (all results have been controlled for
depressivity and trait anxiety).
Electrodermal Activity
EDA data from only nine ALEX and 13 controls are reported.
Due to a technical problem (mistaken usage of false electrodes
during half of the sample data collection) the data of 28 subjects
had to be eliminated from further analysis. The remaining
individuals were representatives of the original ALEX and control
samples. The remaining samples of ALEX and controls did not
differ on depressivity (p < 0.103) but trait-anxiety (p < 0.000).
For this reason, further analyses on EDA have been controlled
only for trait-anxiety.
In arousal condition there was a group difference p = 0.014




Cognitive Empathy (vs. HLB). Separate mixed-effects analysis
for groups of ALEX and controls for the cognitive empathy
condition compared to HLB revealed similar activation in both
groups in areas related to social cognition such as left superior
temporal sulcus, left TPJ, left IFG, left OFC and left temporal pole
(see Table 3 for cluster sizes and coordinates).
Emotional Empathy (vs. HLB). Separate mixed-effects analysis
for groups of ALEX and controls revealed different patterns of
activation in this contrast. The signal change was observed in
controls only in the left OFC and IFG. ALEX in addition to those
areas above had activation in left orbitofrontal gyrus (OFC),
extending to ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), right OFC,
right IFG, left TPJ (see Table 4 for cluster sizes and coordinates).
Subjective Arousal (vs. HLB). The contrast subjective arousal
compared to HLB revealed similar brain areas in each group: left
TPJ, left IFG, left OFC. Additionally, ALEX had a higher signal
change in right IFG, right OFC in ALEX only. Bilateral PCC had
higher signal change only in controls in this contrast (see Table 5
for cluster sizes and coordinates).
Group Effects
Cognitive Empathy (vs. HLB). In cognitive empathy condition
(contrasted to HLB) ALEX had higher activation than controls in
right VLPFC, right TP, right OFC, right MFG and left opercular-
IFG (see Table 6 for cluster sizes and coordinates and Figure 5
for brain activation).
Emotional Empathy (vs. HLB). In emotional empathy
condition (contrasted to HLB) ALEX had higher activation in
the right VLPFC and left OFC (see Table 5 for cluster sizes and
coordinates and Figure 6 for brain activation).
Subjective Arousal (vs. HLB). There were no significant group
differences in cerebral brain activation in subjective arousal
conditions compared to HLB. The only significant cluster was in
the right cerebellum.
Task × Group Interactions
There was no statistically significant activation in all
Task × Group Interactions.
Contrast Cognitive Empathy vs. Subjective Arousal
In contrast, emotion recognition vs. subjective arousal, ALEX
showed higher activation in superior temporal gyrus, r-triangular
IFG, l-opercular IFG, and bilateral thalamus. In the control
group, there was no significant cluster (see Table 7 for cluster
sizes and coordinates).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this study, we aimed to achieve a deeper understanding
of empathic ability in a highly alexithymic sample. For this
purpose, we have investigated emotional and cognitive empathy
in extreme groups of highly alexithymic (ALEX) and very low
alexithymic individuals via a questionnaire measure (IRI; Davis
and Association, 1980; Davis, 1983) as well as an adapted version
of and MET in fMRI, accompanied by measurement of EDA.
Our first hypothesis, that ALEX has an impaired ability
of emotional empathy, has been supported by the results
of the current study. In the behavioral results of MET,
highly alexithymic individuals showed impairment in emotional
empathy, both in the explicit measure of emotional concern
for others and in the implicit measure of being aroused by the
emotional states of others.
The results did not support our second hypothesis that
ALEX has an impaired ability of cognitive empathy. Cognitive
empathy has been measured by MET, which implemented
cognitive empathy as an ability to name the emotional states
of others. The present task of cognitive empathy was based on
affect labeling, which is crucial for interpersonal communication
though is only one aspect of it. ToM, which was not
measured in the current study, is another crucial aspect of
cognitive empathy and Moriguchi et al. (2006) reported lower
ToM in ALEX accompanied by lower activation in MPFC.
Hence, our study, by showing an insignificant difference in
cognitive empathy, highlights the importance of possible other
aspects of interpersonal communication such as ToM. It is
important to note that the equal levels of cognitive empathy
in the current samples of ALEX and the control group was
accompanied by higher activation in several prefrontal brain
structures in ALEX, which will be discussed later in this
paper.
Following our first and second hypotheses, we expected
diminished brain activity in core regions of empathy such
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TABLE 3 | Main effect of cognitive empathy in separate groups.
Main effect of cognitive empathy in ALEX
MNI coordinates
Brain region H x y z z-score Volume, mm3
Posterior STS/posterior middle temporal gyrus (extending to temperoparietal
junction, orbitofrontal cortex and inferior frontal gyrus)
L −56 −50 4 7.59 602,532
Temporal pole (extending to orbitofrontal cortex) R 50 −26 −8 5.81 117,072
Superior frontal gyrus L 2 10 60 5.1 59,940
Precentral gyrus R 46 2 50 4.23 12,987
Main effect of cognitive empathy in controls
Inferior frontal gyrus (extending to orbitofrontal cortex and STS) L −46 18 26 5.53 126,765
Abbreviations: ALEX: highly alexithymic individuals, MNI: Montreal Neurological Institute, H: Hemisphere, L: Left, R: Right, STS: superior temporal sulcus.
TABLE 4 | Main effect of emotional empathy in separate groups.
Main effect of emotional empathy in ALEX
MNI coordinates
Brain region H x y z z-score Volume, mm3
Orbitofrontal cortex (extending to VLPFC) L −48 28 −8 6.02 160,623
Superior frontal gyrus L/R −10 28 56 5.25 141,264
Orbitofrontal cortex R 34 22 −18 4.75 54,621
Angular gyrus (extending to temperoparietal Junction) L −42 −60 18 4.57 53,325
Posterior STS R 52 −28 −10 4.62 26,946
Inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis R 48 22 18 4.64 13,446
Precentral gyrus R 44 4 42 4.2 11,070
Main effect of emotional empathy in Controls
Orbitofrontal cortex (extending to inferior frontal gyrus) L −48 18 8 3.77 14,688
Abbreviations: ALEX, highly alexithymic individuals; MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute; H, Hemisphere; L, Left; R, Right; VLPFC, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; STS, superior temporal
sulcus.
TABLE 5 | Main effect of subjective arousal in separate groups.
Main effect of subjective arousal in ALEX
MNI coordinates
Brain region H x y z z-score Volume, mm3
Superior frontal gyrus (extending to orbitofrontal cortex and inferior frontal gyrus) L/R 2 10 62 4.92 174,555
Posterior cingulate cortex, precuneus L/R 10 −72 8 3.96 54,189
TPJ L −48 −60 20 4.13 20,088
IFG pars opercularis (extending to insula) R 52 22 −4 3.9 17,955
Middle frontal gyrus L −44 8 40 3.96 9261
Main effect of subjective arousal in controls
Middle frontal gyrus (exteniding to IFG, orbitofronal gyrus and temporal pole L −46 6 48 5.68 96,093
STS extending to TPJ L −54 −46 4 4.86 37,395
Superior frontal gyrus extending to anterior cingulate cortex L/R 0 16 54 4.38 30,105
Posterior cingulate cortex L/R −2 −16 32 3.72 11,178
Middle temporal gyrus (extending to TP) R 52 −10 −16 3.47 10,692
Superior frontal gyrus L −2 54 28 4.06 8,856
Abbreviations: ALEX, highly alexithymic individuals; MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute; H, Hemisphere; L, Left; R, Right; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; TPJ, Temperoparietal junction;
STS, superior temporal sulcus.
as IFG, Insula, MPFC, and OFC. It is important to note
that in our study the controls surprisingly never showed a
significantly higher activation than ALEX in any region of
the brain throughout the tasks, although alexithymia has been
associated with diminished brain activity (Taylor and Bagby,
2004; van der Velde et al., 2013; Wingbermühle et al., 2012).
On the contrary, both in cognitive and emotional empathy
conditions, there has been higher right VLPFC and OFC
activation in ALEX. Further, there is evidence linking VLPFC to
social cognition (Pinkham et al., 2008) and emotion regulation
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TABLE 6 | Group effects ALEX > Controls.
Cognitive empathy (vs. HLB)
MNI coordinates
Brain region H x y z z-score Volume, mm3
VLPFC (extending to temporal pole and orbitofrontal cortex) R 36 54 −2 4.45 51,651
Middle temporal gyrus, temporooccipital part R 56 −30 −8 4.27 17,604
Middle temporal gyrus, temporooccipital part L −64 −52 −2 3.57 12,258
Opercular inferior frontal gyrus L −50 16 14 3.81 10,881
Precuneus cortex L −2 −74 28 3.27 8,397
Emotional empathy (vs. HLB)
VLPFC R 34 60 −4 3.89 12,717
Orbitofrontal cortex L −40 22 −16 3.68 9,720
Abbreviations: ALEX, highly alexithymic individuals; MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute; H, Hemisphere; L, Left; R, Right; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; VLPFC, ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex; TPJ, Temperoparietal junction; STS, superior temporal sulcus.
FIGURE 5 | (A) ALEX (n = 24) showed in right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), bilateral middle temporal gyrus, and left
precuneus cortex (Montreal-Neurological-Institute Coordinates z = −2, Axial image) than controls (n = 26) in the contrast cognitive empathy vs. high-level baseline.
Highlighted areas indicate a significant difference between groups in blood oxygen level difference (BOLD) signal (cluster corrected z > 2.7, p < 0.05). Abbreviations:
ALEX, highly alexithymic individuals. (B) ALEX (n = 24) showed higher activity in left opercular-IFG (Montreal-Neurological-Institute Coordinates x = −50, y = 14,
z = 10) than controls (n = 26) in the contrast cognitive empathy vs. high-level baseline. Highlighted areas indicate a significant difference between groups in BOLD
signal (cluster corrected z > 2.7, p < 0.05). Abbreviations: ALEX, highly alexithymic individuals.
(Lieberman et al., 2007; Townsend et al., 2012). Activation
of VLPFC and simultaneous downregulation of the amygdala
has been reported several times (Diekhof et al., 2011; Buhle
et al., 2013; Silvers et al., 2016). In a task very similar to our
cognitive empathy paradigm, Lieberman et al. (2007) found
that right VLPFC specifically down-regulated amygdala activity
and reported that enhanced activity in VLPFC might lead
to diminished activity of the amygdala, which in turn might
be related to declined emotional experience. In a real-time
fMRI neurofeedback study Paret et al. (2016) have shown
that voluntary down-regulation of the amygdala increased the
connectivity between the amygdala and ventromedial PFC,
which brings out strong evidence from the first real-time
neurofeedback study about the effects of down-regulation
between PFC and amygdala. Since we have not employed
connectivity analyses we cannot confidently assume that
down-regulation of limbic structures via higher activation
of VLPFC, but it is still a possibility for explaining lower
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FIGURE 6 | Higher activity in ALEX (n = 24) in the contrast emotional empathy vs. high-level baseline in right VLPFC (image on the left;
Montreal-Neurological-Institute Coordinates x = 44, y = 48, z = −8) and left OFC (image on the right; Montreal-Neurological-Institute Coordinates x = −42, y = 24,
z = −14) than controls (n = 26). Highlighted areas indicate a significant difference between groups in BOLD signal (cluster corrected z > 2.7, p < 0.05).
Abbreviations: ALEX, highly alexithymic individuals; VLPF, the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex.
TABLE 7 | Contrast cognitive empathy vs. subjective arousal in separate groups.
Main effect in ALEX
MNI coordinates
Brain region H x y z z-score Volume, mm3
STS R −58 −56 4 5.89 186,921
STS R 60 −52 4 4.82 49,005
IFG pars triangularis (extending to opercular IFG) R 52 36 8 4.79 12,852
Thalamus R 2 −10 6 4.09 9,855
Inferior occipital gyrus R 36 −84 −18 4.3 8,748
Abbreviations: ALEX, highly alexithymic individuals; MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute; H, Hemisphere; L, Left; R, Right; STS, superior temporal sulcus; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus.
emotional experience in alexithymia, which should be subjected
to further research.
In our study, ALEX showed enhanced OFC activation
during both empathy tasks. Besides being related to several
other cognitive functions, OFC is an important brain structure
related to recognizing the significance of emotional stimuli
(Levens and Phelps, 2010; Golkar et al., 2012), to emotion
regulation (Decety, 2011) and emotional empathy (Cox et al.,
2012). Rare studies are reporting altered OFC structure or
function in alexithymia. Kano et al. (2003) showed in a
PET study decreased regional cerebral blood flow in the
right OFC in reaction to negative emotional stimuli in
highly alexithymic individuals. van der Velde et al. (2014)
report an association between affective alexithymia and lower
gray matter volumes in OFC. In a meta-analysis, Xu et al.
(2018) report consistently lower gray matter volumes in OFC
concerning alexithymia.
According to our findings, in ALEX there has been higher
temporal pole activation in both cognitive and emotional
empathy tasks. The temporal pole is known to be a region
involved in social cognition (Olson et al., 2007) and specifically
in the empathy network (Singer, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2011;
Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).
ALEX had higher activity in left IFG only in cognitive
empathy but not in emotional empathy tasks. Also, in the
contrast of cognitive empathy vs. subjective arousal as an
implicit measure of emotional empathy, there has been a
higher activation in left IFG in ALEX. There is strong evidence
showing opercular IFG as a core structure for empathic ability
(Moriguchi et al., 2006; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009; Fallon et al.,
2018), and also for language production (Liakakis et al., 2011;
Hobson et al., 2018). IFG’s coexisting contribution to language
and emotional processes is coherent with left IFG’s specific
involvement in this experiment in a task with more language-
related components than subjective arousal tasks, which require
the internal representation of one’s own emotional state. Brain
areas involved in cognitive and emotional empathy tasks in
ALEX were almost the same prefrontal areas, except IFG,
which we observed only for cognitive empathy. Prefrontal areas
are crucial for the cognitive control of emotion processing
(Ochsner and Gross, 2005) and emotion regulation (Lieberman
et al., 2007). We assume that the extensive involvement of
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prefrontal areas may have allowed ALEX compensate their
deficits in emotion processing with cognitive empathy (in
our experiment conspired as naming emotions/affect labeling)
but insufficiently for a positive functioning in emotional
empathy, which prerequisites the ability to feel for the other
and to be able to recognize congruent feelings in one’s
own self.
ALEX reported lower levels of subjective arousal during the
fMRI task which was also supported by the implicit physiological
measure of lower SCR. At the mean time on the questionnaire
measure of IRI (Davis and Association, 1980; Davis, 1983), ALEX
reported higher personal distress when they were confronted
with others’ discomfort, accompanied by lower levels of empathic
concern and cognitive empathy (perspective taking). This result
is following the findings of Moriguchi et al. (2006). According
to Decety (2011), Eisenberg and Eggum (2009) and Lamm
and Tomova (2018), observing another distressed person can
result in several different reactions, such as sympathy (also
called empathic concern, ‘‘feeling for’’), emotional contagion
‘‘feeling as,’’ or fear, avoidance, and personal distress. Personal
distress is self-directed and aversive and is not aimed at to
relieve the other person from uncomfortable feelings but merely
one’s own. In contrast, sympathy/empathic concern is an other-
directed prosocial feeling. Decety and Lamm (2009) argue
that if not regulated, this distress might intervene with an
individual’s ability to react and resolve the stressful situation. At
this point, it is meaningful to look at stress-related regulation
mechanisms. Besides the sympathoadrenomedullary (SAM)
system, the hypothalamic-pituitary- adrenocortical-system is the
main system of primates responsible for immediate coping
with stress through the regulation of cortisol secretion (White
and Buchanan, 2016). HPA-system does not react with higher
levels of cortisol not only in situations when the individual
experience stress herself but also in observing others in
distress (Buchanan et al., 2012; Engert et al., 2017). Buchanan
et al. (2012) have also reported higher cortisol production
by the observants with higher levels of empathic concern
and perspective-taking on IRI. These results have also been
supported by a recent meta-analysis by Engert et al. (2019).
In a previous study of ours (Alkan Härtwig et al., 2013),
ALEX have shown lower (HPA) system function measured
through cortisol-awakening response (CAR), which indicates
an alteration in the basic function of HPA-System in healthy
alexithymic individuals even without direct exposure to stress.
All these considered, these results point to the possibility of
an underlying HPA-system-disfunction in understanding why
ALEX show less emotional empathy when confronted with
others’ distress.
To our knowledge, this has been the first neuroimaging
study that has examined cognitive and emotional empathy
simultaneously in alexithymia. The large sample of physically
and mentally healthy highly alexithymic participants (ALEX),
who were closely matched demographically to their controls,
contributed to the strength of the study. Also, the assessment
of alexithymia did not only depend on self-report measures but
was supported by an observer measurement. Finally, to eliminate
all possible interactions with depressivity and anxiousness,
all results have been controlled for these two dimensions.
Therefore, we are confident that the results of this study reflect
alexithymia in and of itself and are not confounded with other
psychological problems and disorders, as in many studies using
clinical samples.
The current results indicate a specific impairment of
alexithymic individuals in experiencing emotions but not
in naming them since the ALEX sample showed a similar
level of competence in naming emotions as the control
group. Experiencing the emotional states is commonly
thought to be a precursory of naming the emotions. Still,
the current results indicate an impairment in the basic
emotional experience which does not directly lead to an
impairment in the naming of emotions to the same extent.
We propose that higher prefrontal activation overcomes
the impairments in emotional functioning in ALEX in
basic tasks such as affect labeling. Thus, ALEX participants
manage to score similar to controls in cognitive empathy
tasks. But this prefrontal activation is insufficient when the
tasks involve more complicated functions such as emotional
empathy. We also empathize that altered HPA-system function
might be also related to lower levels of emotional empathy
in ALEX.
How this extensive cognitive effort accompanied by the higher
levels of personal distress is related to a dysfunction in the feeling
of emotions and if it is due to a possible down-regulation of
limbic structures by prefrontal activity (Lieberman et al., 2007;
Silvers et al., 2016) should be examined in future studies via
functional and structural connectivity.
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